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Abstract 
In this paper, we show how capital structure decisions made by non-financial firms listed in the Tunis Stock Exchange 
are affected by the predictions of the so-called market timing theory. Using a set of some relevant variables which 
reflect the market-timing signals, the firm fundamentals, and the performance of local stock market, we mainly find 
that leverage ratio of Tunisian firms is short-term driven by their current market valuations. In the long run, the market 
timing effects are not present at all. Rather, Tunisian firms seem to behave according to the tradeoff theory of capital 
structure by attempting to adjust their leverage levels towards a target ratio.
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     1. Introduction
The choice of capital structure has always been an important issue in corporate governance 
practices since all firms are concerned regardless their stage of development and size. In 
finance literature, a significant number of works, both theoretical and empirical, have studied 
the determinants of capital structure, but the results are in general not conclusive. For the ma-
jority of academic researchers, the recent observed evolutions of the listed firms’ debt-equity 
ratios worldwide are still challenging in the theory of corporate finance and difficult to be 
puzzled out. The main reason of this assessment is that none of the three competitive theories 
in the field (Static Tradeoff, Pecking Order and Market Timing Models) can solely explain 
the dynamic changes of capital structure documented in past studies. Thus, the relative im-
portance of these models depends on different researches and the generalization of the results
is not possible for instance. 
As a starting point of the paper, it is necessary to recall the foundations and explanations 
of the aforementioned theories with regard to the management of capital structure. In general, 
the static tradeoff framework is based on the existence of an optimum capital structure and a 
target debt-to-equity ratio. The said target ratio is the one which maximizes the firm value 
and which, by default, shows the optimal level of debts to use. Within this situation, man-
agement of the firm considers a balance between tax saving advantages and costs, especially 
increasing bankruptcy risk and agency costs, associated with debt services.
The pecking order  theory of capital structure,  which appeared in the seminal work of 
Myers and Majluf (1984), neglects the existence of such a target debt-to-equity ratio as in the 
tradeoff theory and rests instead on the domination of the costs related to the asymmetries of 
information between managers (who are well informed on the future prospects of their firms), 
and external investors (who are aware of the asymmetric information). Other costs are, ac-
cording to these authors, of less importance. Practically speaking, firms elaborate a hierarchy 
of financing sources when a supplementary capital is required. The priority is given to self-
financing means when available, debt is preferred over equity when an external financing is 
needed, and finally equity is only issued at the last resort when it is not possible for a firm to 
contract more debt.
Another competitor of the tradeoff theory is the market timing theory which states that 
managers of a firm look for the good times to make appropriate financing decisions. In effect, 
they issue new stocks when the related cost of equity is lower than that of alternative types of 
external financing, thanks to high market valuation of the firm’s stocks. When the firm’s 
stocks are underevaluated (i.e., the cost of equity issuance is high), they do give up this op-
tion and favor the use of debt instruments. As a result, successful timings of the equity mar-
kets contribute to reduce significantly the cost of capital supported by considered firms. Re-
searches focusing on market-timing-driven financial decisions are widely motivated by the 
work of Baker and Wurgler (2002). Indeed, these authors show that temporary changes in 
past market valuations of the firm lead to management’s efforts to time the market and con-
sequently to permanent changes in capital structure. The conclusions of several recent papers 
are, however, inconsistent with empirical evidences of Baker and Wurgler (2002) as we can 
see later in the literature review section.
In this paper, we examine the predictions of market timing theory and their effects on the 
capital structure choices of Tunisian firms. The study is particularly led by two motivations. 
First, we attempt to test the market timing theory using a different set of data since the debate 
on its explanatory power is far from settled. Empirical evidences from an emerging market 
can lead to further insights into the implications of such theory. Second, Tunisian firms are of 
particular interest because very few studies are devoted to examine this issue and their beha-
vior is influenced by a number of cultural-, legal-, and institutional-specific factors. At the 2
empirical level, we find that market valuations have small impact on the leverage of Tunisian 
firms in the short run, and this influence is not persistent over time. In addition, the choice of 
financing means of Tunisian firms is independent of the performance of the local stock ex-
change.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of selected 
papers in the related literature. Section 3 describes our empirical study. Results are discussed 
in Section 4 and concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.
2. Literature Review 
Market timing is not a recent research topic in corporate finance. Studies of this category in-
clude, for example, Taggart (1977), March (1982), Javiland and Harris (1984), and Asquith 
and Mullins (1986), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Hovakimian and al. (2001). It is com-
monly demonstrated that a firm issues new stocks when its market value exceeds the book 
value (i.e., usually when the market-to-book ratio is high) and buy back stocks otherwise. If 
the timing is good, equity issuance is less costly and it would allow the firm to increase its 
capacity to issue debt securities in the future during the period of less favorable conditions. 
Equity financing is also used in cases where investors are optimistic about the firm’s future 
earnings. At this stage, the survey of Graham and Harvey (2001) on corporate financial poli-
cy joins previous assessments in the sense that management of US firms attaches a great im-
portance to the fluctuations of stock prices at the time of making financing decisions.
  In a slightly different manner, Korajczyk and al. (1992) develop a model to assess the ef-
fect of time-varying asymmetric information on the timing of equity issues and find that firms 
with assets of high quality generally wait for the market to become better informed before 
issuing new equity, whereas firms with low asset quality always try to issue immediately as 
the opportunity arises. Then, the problem of adverse selection becomes more marked as man-
agers receive new private information after the actual issue date.
Subsequent to above studies, the majority of recent papers on market-timing-driven finan-
cial decisions can be viewed as reactions to the conclusions of Baker and Wurgler (2002) that 
the effects of historical market values, measured by the book-to-market ratio, on capital struc-
ture are very persistent and that “capital structure is the cumulative outcome of attempts to 
time the equity market. This is a simple theory of capital structure. To our knowledge, it has 
not been articulated before”.
Indeed, Frank and Goyal (2004) ask the relevance of these findings by examining annual 
data of non-financial US firms over the period from 1952 to 2000. A Vector Autoregressive 
model is used and stock market conditions are proxied by the market-to-book ratio. Accor-
dingly, the authors report that deviations from a long-run equilibrium of financial leverage 
affect debt adjustments rather than equity adjustments. This evidence supports not only the 
predictions of the market timing theory, but also those of the tradeoff theory. Hennessy and 
Whited (2005) underline the importance of understanding corporate financial decisions in 
dynamic settings and show that dynamic tradeoff model is totally capable of explaining the 
observed relationship between firm’s market-to-book ratio and the leverage. Firms with high 
market valuations tend, de factor, to finance their growth by issuing new equity in order to 
avoid financial distresses. The results of Leary and Roberts (2005) indicate that firms do re-
spond to stock price movements by appropriately rebalancing their leverage, but their reac-
tion might not be immediate and persistent. It can be only the case when there is presence of 
adjustment costs such as bankruptcy costs and information asymmetries. In addition, the ad-
justment process whose aims are to keep financial leverage in an optimal range can take from 
one to four years. In a related study, Alti (2006) also questions the relevance of explanatory 3
variables used by Baker and Wurgler (2002) in capturing the influence of market timing and 
propose to detect market timing effects in IPO markets. The author defines market timers as 
the firms that go public in the ‘hot issue market’ (i.e., high market valuations and high IPO 
volume in terms of number of issuers) more significantly than the cold firms do. However, 
the timing behavior of hot-market firms generally reverses two years after their IPOs as they 
raise more debts and less equity than cold-market firms. These results lead the author to con-
clude that market timing effects on leverage ratios are present in the short term and corporate 
financial policies appear to be consistent with the existence of leverage targets.
Finally, Kayhan and Titman (2007) document strong influences of historical changes in 
firm’s stock prices and financial deficits on their capital structure, but their findings contrast 
previous studies and particularly Baker and Wurgler (2002) in that these market timing ef-
fects are at least partially reversed afterwards.  Just  like Alti (2006), Kayhan  and Titman 
(2007) argue that firms manage their dynamic financing choices according to the predictions 
of tradeoff theory.
Our study will contribute to this intriguing debate and add more insights on the effects of 
market timing theory on firm’s capital structure choices through drawing empirical evidences 
from an emerging market. For this purpose, the next section develops our empirical models.
3. Empirical study
We develop three time-series cross-sectional models to test the market timing theory in Tuni-
sian context, of which the first attempts to examine the market timing effects in the short term 
by  introducing  the  commonly  used  market-to-book  variable  (MTB). We  then  employ  a
weighted average MTB variable in the second model, as in Baker and Wurgler (2002), to 
investigate whether the detected effects are persistent over time. The third model, which is 
derived from the second model by adding the MTB variable, allows for robust checking of 
our conclusions.
We perform our analysis based on a sample of twenty-five non-financial listed firms. An-
nual data used for dependent and independent variables we present below are taken from the 
BVMT (Stock Exchanges of Tunis) and the study period is comprised between 1998 and 
2006.
3.1 Summary measures of dependent and independent variables 
Two main measures are commonly used in finance literature as proxies of firm’s leverage: 
ratio of total debts to total assets and ratio of long-term debts to total assets (see, for example, 
Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; and Kayhan and Titman, 2007). The majori-
ty of past studies consider both the accounting and market value of debts to compute the debt 
ratio, but in some cases, only accounting value is used due essentially to the non-availability 
of market data (see, e.g., Miguel and Pindado, 2001). Throughout this research, we construct 
these two summary measures from the accounting value of the debts due to the lack of debt 
market data. They are referred to as total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio.
In what follows, we define all independent variables used in this study which include mar-
ket-timing indicators and control variables such as firm fundamentals and performance meas-
ure of local stock market.
Firm Size (FS): Rajan and Zingales (1995) report the existence of a positive relation be-
tween debt ratio and firm size. That is, large firms have an easier access to capital markets 
and a greater debt capacity than small firms. The reason stems from the greater diversifica-
tion degree and the resulting smaller default probability of large firms. Some recent studies 4
document the similar relationship (see, e.g., Ozkan, 2001; Fama and French, 2002; and Zou 
and Xiao, 2006). In contrast with these studies, Heshmati (2001) and Chen (2004) find a neg-
ative relation between these two variables in the context of Swedish and Chinese firms re-
spectively. They explain this phenomenon by the fact that large firms, being perceived by 
investors as highly creditworthy, often issue equity to finance their projects. In light of past 
studies, we propose to gauge the effect of this variable by taking the natural log of the firm’s 
total assets, as follows:
ets)  total ass Ln (firm's  (FS) Size Firm
Asset Tangibility (AT): As similar as the firm size variable, asset tangibility can be posi-
tively or negatively correlated with the debt ratio. Results and their interpretations therefore 
vary with studies. A positive correlation is predicted by agency theory as tangible assets will 
lose less value than intangible assets and provide greater protection (or guarantees) for the 
firm’s lenders in case of default. Moreover, the risk of moral hazard resulting from debt fi-
nancing is considerably reduced when firms are able to offer real guarantees to protect debt 
claims. Inversely, firms with high asset tangibility are less exposed to information asymme-
tries and often take advantage of this situation to issue more equity, leading to a negative cor-
relation between the said variables. Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), Miguel and Pinda-
do (2001), and Delcoure (2007), we measure asset tangibility by:
assets Total
s inventorie assets Tangible
(AT) y  Tangibilit Asset 


Profitability (PROFIT): The empirical relationship between firm’s profitability levels and 
leverage is unclear according to previous findings. Theoretically, the majority of researchers 
agree to say that these variables can be only positively linked because profitable firms usually 
suffer from problems associated with the efficient use of free cash flows and debt financing is 
the best way to eliminate these undesired effects due to the disciplinary role of debt contracts. 
In addition, the fact that debt issue is widely seen as a way for profitable firms to benefit from 
tax  savings equally  strengthens  this  positive  correlation.  This  theoretical  view  is  shared 
among proponents of both tradeoff and pecking order theories. We handle this relationship 
using the following ratio:
assets Total
 taxes coporate and interests before Earnings
(PROFIT) ity  Profitabil 
Performance of local stock exchange (IBVMT): We measure the local market performance 
using Tunis stock exchange BVMT index, which is a price-weighted index created on Sep-
tember 30
th, 1990 and adjusted on April 1
st, 1998. Such variable was used in the empirical 
model developed by Frank and Goyal (2005).
Market-to-book ratio (MTB): This ratio helps to identify market timers in Tunisian stock 
exchange. In theory, firms seek to time the stock market (or equivalently issue more equity) 
when their market-to-book ratio is high. As discussed previously, such operation lowers the 
firm’s cost of capital compared with alternative financing means. This variable is measured 
as:
assets Total
debts tion capitaliza Market 
(MTB) ratio book  to Market

  5
Weighted average market-to-book ratio (MTB
wa): The use of this ratio aims at testing the 
persistence of the market timing effects on capital structure of Tunisian listed firms. The idea 
behind this ratio is that it takes into account the historical variations in market valuations.
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In this formula, 
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1 - t MTB refers to the external finance weighted average MTB ratio for the 
year (t-1). The sum of es and ds indicates the total amount of net equity and debt issues during 
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correspond to the total sum of net equity and debt issues over the period from the first year of 
the study period to the year (t-1).
3.2 Empirical models
We  now  turn  to  presenting our  empirical models.  We  first test  whether capital  structure 
choices of studied firms are driven by market timing theory in the short term. To this end, we 
estimate a model similar to Baker and Wurgler (2002) by regressing the firm’s leverage (ei-
ther the total debt ratio or the long-term debt ratio) on a set of explanatory variables, but it 
further allows for the impact of local market performance on leverage ratio (Model 1).
Model 1:  it t it it it it it IBVMT FS PROFIT AT MTB y               5 4 3 2 1 0
where  it y represents the ratio of total debts to total assets or the ratio of long-term debts to 
total assets for the firm i (i = 1, 2,…, 25) at the time t. If the effects of market timing on capi-
tal structure really exist in the short term (i.e.,  1  is negative and significantly different from 
zero), we then test their persistence over time by replacing the MTBit variable by 
wa
it MTB 1 
variable (Model 2). By construction, the later is lagged one time period in order to capture the 
effects of historical market valuations on the firm’s leverage. A negative and significant im-
pact of 
wa
it MTB 1  on it y is expected to confirm the dominance of market timing theory. Other-
wise, changes in leverage are explained by the tradeoff theory according to which firms make 
the most of good market valuations to adjust their capital structure towards targets.  
Model 2: it t it it it
wa
it it IBVMT FS PROFIT AT MTB y                5 4 3 2 1 1 0
  
Model 3 presented below is used to check for the robustness of the results obtained from 
the test of persistent effects of market timing. In effect, we add into Model 2 the MTB varia-
ble in order to control for both current and historical variations in the market-to-book ratio. 
This inclusion is of great importance because we can separate the short-term and long-term 
impacts of market timing. In this schema of things, the predictions of market timing theory 
are entirely valid only if the 
wa
it MTB 1  variable continues to exert a negative and significant 
impact on firm’s leverage.6
Model 3:  it it t it it it
wa
it it MTB IBVMT FS PROFIT AT MTB y                  6 5 4 3 2 1 1 0
All the regressions are performed using STATA Data Analysis and Statistical Software.
Our estimation procedure provides Generalized Least Squares (GLS), fixed-effect and ran-
dom-effect estimators with robust standard errors and clustering to allow for any serial corre-
lation of errors. Indeed, the fixed-effects estimation enables to control for omitted indepen-
dent variables that differ between studied firms, but are constant over time, while the random-
effects estimation is used to take into account the impact of any omitted independent va-
riables that may be constant over time, but vary between studied firms, and any others that 
may be fixed between firms, but vary over time. The Hausman test, which empirically com-
pares the consistent fixed-effects model with the efficient random-effects model, is also car-
ried out. The testing hypothesis is that differences in the estimated coefficients of the said 
models are not systematic. 
4. Results and interpretations
Before interpreting the results, it is worth notifying that the empirical statistics (
2) of the 
Hausman specification test is very low and insignificant for all time-series cross-sectional 
regressions we performed (cf., Table 1 to Table 6). This is informative of the fact that the 
random-effects estimation provides the best linear unbiased estimators of the model coeffi-
cients, compared with the GLS and fixed-effects estimations. The validity of this assessment 
holds for both measurements of the capital structure. Consequently, the following discussions 
are intentionally based on the results of the random-effects estimation.
Table 1
Estimation results of Model 1 with the total debt ratio as dependent variable




Constant      -1.215
***
(-5.08)
      -2.005
***  
(-4.15)
       -1.741
***   
(-4.59)
Market-to-Book (×10
-5)      -0.625
***
(-4.16)
       -0.281
***   
(-3.26)
    -0.299
***
(-3.47)








Profitability     -1.195
***
(-6.46)
    -0.553
***
(-3.38)
      -0.637
***   
         (-4.11)
Firm size      0.095
***
(7.17)
    0.137
***
(4.95)











2        0.4315
R
2 (within)         0.3493
R
2 (overall)         0.3982
Chi-squared statistics of 
the Hausman test 3.25
Number of observations 199 199 199
Notes: Adjusted R
2, R
2 (within) and R
2 (overall) express the overall explanatory power of the GLS model, the 
fixed-effects model and the random-effects model respectively. Numbers in parenthesis represent the robust 
standard errors of the corresponding coefficients. 
***, 
** and 
* indicate that estimated coefficients are significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.7
Table 2
Estimation results of Model 1 with the long-term debt ratio as dependent variable




Constant       -0.831
***  
(-5.13)
     -1.313
***  
(-3.36)

















    0.053    
(1.22)






   -0.549
***
(-4.53)
Firm size    0.052
***
(5.82)
     0.083
***  
(3.72)











2        0.3633
R
2 (within)        0.2542
R
2 (overall)          0.3391
Chi-squared statistics of 
the Hausman test 1.76
Number of observations 199 199 199
Notes: Adjusted R
2, R
2 (within) and R
2 (overall) express the overall explanatory power of the GLS model, the 
fixed-effects model and the random-effects model respectively. Numbers in parenthesis represent the robust 
standard errors of the corresponding coefficients. 
***, 
** and 
* indicate that estimated coefficients are significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Tables 1 and 2 report the estimation results of Model 1. At the first sight, we can notice 
that the considered model explains only a small portion of the variations in the firm’s capital 
structure, as shown by R-squared (overall) coefficients.  Indeed, the later reaches 39.82% 
when the total debt ratio is used as dependent variable, and 33.91% in the case of the long-
term debt ratio.
Regarding the estimated coefficients, the firm’s size and profitability measures are highly 
significant in all cases as expected. This finding reinforces their relevance among the empiri-
cal determinants of the capital structure of the Tunisian firms. The asset tangibility variable 
appears, however, to be less important in explaining the capital structure in the Tunisian con-
text because its impact on the long-term debt ratio is insignificant, and becomes felt and sig-
nificant at the 10% level when the total debt ratio is used. The impacts from the local stock 
market index (IBVMT) on capital structure are insignificant in both random-effects estima-
tion, leading to think that trends in Tunis stock exchange do not affect the financing behavior 
of Tunisian firms. This result is in contradiction with the findings revealed by the majority of 
previous studies including for example Frank and Goyal (2005), which show the existence of 
a negative relation between stock market performance and debt ratio.
As for the short-term market timing effects represented by the actual market-to-book ra-
tios, the associated coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level when the dependant 
variable is the total debt ratio and at the 10% level when it is about the long-term debt ratio. 
The fact that this ratio is negatively correlated with two measures of capital structure is typi-
cally coherent with the basic ideas of the market timing theory according to which firms issue 
more equity when their valuations are high, and by doing so reduce their leverage. Besides, it 
is important to underline that, albeit significant, the impact of market timing on the leverage 
of Tunisian firms is relatively small. 8
Table 3
Estimation results of Model 2 with the total debt ratio as dependent variable




Constant       -1.211
***  
(-4.89)
     -2.108
***
  (-4.26)





















Profitability    -1.207
***  
(-6.30)
   -0.587
***
(-3.51)
   -0.683
***
(-4.30)
Firm size    0.096
***
(6.99)
     0.143
***
(5.07)











2        0.3903
R
2 (within)        0.3145
R
2 (overall) 0.3701
Chi-squared statistics of 
the Hausman test 4.55
Number of observations 199 199 199
Notes: Adjusted R
2, R
2 (within) and R
2 (overall) express the overall explanatory power of the GLS model, the 
fixed-effects model and the random-effects model respectively. Numbers in parenthesis represent the robust 
standard errors of the corresponding coefficients. 
***, 
** and 
* indicate that estimated coefficients are significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 4
Estimation results of Model 2 with the long-term debt ratio as dependent variable





    -0.830
***
(- 5.10)
         -1.354
***      
(-3.44)






  -0.236   
(-0.24)














      (-5.19)
  -0.522
***














-4)    0.063    
  (0.23)                     
    -0.080      
          (0.44)      
-0.023  







Chi-squared statistics of 
the Hausman test 1.84
Number of observations 199 199 199
Notes: Adjusted R
2, R
2 (within) and R
2 (overall) express the overall explanatory power of the GLS model, the 




* indicate that estimated coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.9
Some authors argue that the observed effects of market timing that we document in Model 
1 is only temporary because firms might take advantage of the good conditions of the market 
to issue equities with lower costs, but they only do that when they need to adjust their capital 
structure towards a target leverage ratio. Further, firms do not behave the same over time as 
predicted by the theory of market timing. We now examine this purpose on the basis of the 
estimation results of Models 2 and 3. The goal is to show whether the market timing effects 
reported in Tables 1 and 2 persist over time.
First, Model 2 is estimated and results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. The variable of great 
interest is none other than the weighted average book-to-market ratio reflecting the past mar-
ket valuations of the studied firms instead of the current book-to-market ratio we use in Mod-
el 1. Globally, the explanatory power of Model 2 with random-effects is not much different 
from that of Model 1 (37.01% and 33.49%). The firm size and profitability variables continue 
to exert significant impacts on the firm’s financing decisions, while the asset tangibility and 
stock market performance have practically no effects. In regard to the weighted average mar-
ket-to-book ratio, this variable is not significant at all for our sample firms. These results con-
trast the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2002), and Huang and Ritter (2006), who found neg-
ative and significant effects of historical valuations on the firm’s debt ratio. They rather 
strengthen  the  findings  of Leary  and  Roberts  (2005),  Flannery  and  Rangan  (2006),  Alti 
(2006), Hovakimian (2006), and Kayhan and Titman (2007) who do not find persistent ef-
fects of market timing on capital structure based on various sample data.
Table 5
Estimation results of Model 3 with the total debt ratio as dependent variable





     -1.215
***  
(-5.08)
    -1.981
***
(-4.09)


























    -0.638
***  
(-4.12)
Firm size     0.095
***
(7.15)
   0.135
***
(4.89)





       (0.98)       
0.209
(0.94)









        (-3.12)
     -0.356
***   







Chi-squared statistics of 
the Hausman test 3.16
Number of observations 199 199 199
Notes: Adjusted R
2, R
2 (within) and R
2 (overall) express the overall explanatory power of the GLS model, the 
fixed-effects model and the random-effects model respectively. Numbers in parenthesis represent the robust 
standard errors of the corresponding coefficients. 
***, 
** and 
* indicate that estimated coefficients are significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.10
Table 6
Estimation results of Model 3 with the total long-term debt ratio as dependent variable





   -0.831
***
(-5.12)
     -1.284
***  
(-3.28)










   0.966   
(1.30)







Profitability   -0.652
***
(-5.19)
   -0.504
***  
         (-3.82)
   -0.549
***
(-4.53)
Firm size    0.052
***
(5.80)
   0.081
***
         (3.63)







        -0.039









        (-2.15)
   -0.188








Chi-squared statistics of 
the Hausman test 1.61
Number of observations 199 199 199
Notes: Adjusted R
2, R
2 (within) and R
2 (overall) express the overall explanatory power of the GLS model, the 
fixed-effects model and the random-effects model respectively. Numbers in parenthesis represent the robust 
standard errors of the corresponding coefficients. 
***, 
** and 
* indicate that estimated coefficients are significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Second, as a checking step, the effect of the current market-to-book and the weighted av-
erage market-to-book ratios is simultaneously analyzed in Model 3. As discussed in the pre-
vious section, this test allows us to reassess the persistent effects of the firm’s valuation histo-
ries on the debt ratio once the short-term influences are controlled. Concretely, the estimation 
results, reported in Tables 5 and 6, do not permit to bring out the persistent effect in keeping 
with the requirements of the market timing theory, meanwhile they confirm the results of 
Model 2. Indeed, we can observe the strong significance of the short-term effects represented 
by the current market-to-book ratio, at the 1% level when firm’s leverage is measured by the 
total debt ratio and at the 5% level for the long-term debt ratio, and the expected relationship 
between these variables.
5. Concluding remarks  
Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that changes in market valuations have large effects on 
the firm’s capital financing choices that persist over time. The efforts to time the market are 
thereby associated with the reduction of the leverage ratio because firms tend to issue equity 
when their market values are high. In this article, we provide empirical evidence on the valid-
ity of the market timing theory in explaining dynamic variations in capital structure of twen-
ty-five non-financial Tunisian firms.
In summary, main findings of our study are as follows. First, the market valuations have 
only slight effects on the observed fluctuations of the debt ratios of our sample firms in the 11
short-term. Second, the aforementioned effects are insignificant and not persistent over time. 
Third, firm size and profitability appear to be the most preeminent determinants of the capital 
structure decisions in the Tunisian context whereas the influence of stock market perfor-
mance and asset tangibility is almost insignificant.
Globally, our results corroborate with those of the majority of empirical works in related 
field like Flannery and Ranjan (2006), and Kayhan and Titman (2007), but are not in line 
with those of Baker and Wurgler (2002). We then think that the market timing theory is not 
capable of fully explaining the firm’s actual financing behavior. 
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